La sovranità “limitata” di bilancio come principio supremo. Primi appunti su due concetti ambigui a margine della recente giurisprudenza costituzionale tedesca

The project investigates the possible membership of the principle of "sovereignty of the budget" to the category of so-called "Supreme constitutional principles". Highlighted the ambiguity and the common reference to the assessments "material" of the two concepts, it is necessary to define them stipulative: for 'supreme principle' will be considered (only) those provisions excluded from the possibility of constitutional change; for 'fiscal sovereignty' would seem appropriate to refer to a power not absolute, but limited in the subject in question. An analysis of recent decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, on one hand confirms the connection between the "sovereignty of the budget" and the supreme democratic and social principles, but on the other side it shows how to identify the "core" of the matter removed from the legitimate possibility of constitutional revision clashes with the difficulty of finding clear application standards for economic evaluation formulas set out in the case law. The essay investigates the causes of these difficulties and it indicates some possible solutions, which may reconcile the judgment of the constitutionality with the discretional spaces of the legislature.