The sanctioner’s dilemma: The disruptive impact of a Kantian constitutivist approach

To show the promise of the Kantian constitutivist approach to international relations, I consider its relevance in the case of the “sanctioner’s dilemma.” This dilemma arises when the costs of sanctioning a state for the violation of international law seem prohibitive, for instance when a state is strategically important and its absence would significantly undermine global cooperation, or because the proposed sanctions would have humanitarian consequences. This case is generally analyzed in terms of cost–benefit and discussed against the background of strategic rationality. My contention is that the instrumentalist view fails to fully capture the nature of the dilemma. Instead, the constitutivist argument offers a deeper understanding of the dynamics of power and authority inherent in the sanctioner’s dilemma and highlights some morally perplexing aspects of sanctions. The discussion brings to the fore the potentially disruptive impact of a Kantian constructivist approach in the field of international relations.