Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions
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Data di Pubblicazione:
2010
Citazione:
Bilancini, E. e L., Boncinelli. "Strict Nash equilibria in large gameswith strict single crossing in types and actions" Working paper, RECENT WORKING PAPER SERIES, Dipartimento di Economia Marco Biagi – Università di Modena e Reggio Emilia, 2010.
Abstract:
In this paper we study games where the space of player types is atomless, action spaces are second countable, and payoffs functions satisfy the property of strict single crossing in types and actions. Our main
finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and
discuss the relevant consequences of our result
finding is that in this class of games every Nash equilibrium is essentially strict. We briefly develop and
discuss the relevant consequences of our result
Tipologia CRIS:
Working paper
Keywords:
atomless; single crossing; strict Nash; pure Nash; monotone Nash
Elenco autori:
Bilancini, E.; Boncinelli, L.
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